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The RIAA v. The People: The
Recording Industry's Misguided
Attempt to Use the Legal System to
Save Their Business Model
"There is a point when the public at large embraces a new idea and
there is no turning back. For the music industry, that point has
passed. What we need to acknowledge now is that as attitudes,
values, behavior and societal mores evolve and change, the rules
change. Today's taboo becomes tomorrow's normal, acceptable,
legal behavior. However, when the rules don't change and lose step
with the times, ordinary, otherwise law-abiding people 'flaunt' the
rules. Anyone remember Prohibition?"'
-- Fred Goldring, Billboard magazine
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1. Fred Goldring, Abandon the 'Shock and Awe' Tactics: An Eight-Step Recovery Program for
a Healthier Music Industry, BILLBOARD, Oct. 25, 2003, at 14. Mr. Goldring describes himself as
"someone who earns a living working with musicians, record companies and publishing companies."
Id. In addition to being a columnist for Billboard magazine, Mr. Goldring is also a musician. Id.
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Instead of providing music lovers with the product they desire - MP3s
that are available to be downloaded from online "stores" - the music
industry has decided to sue its own customers. Between September 2003
and January 2005, it filed suit against more than 8,400 "alleged song-
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swappers," with more lawsuits sure to come.2 The music industry, led by
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), has shown a desire
to file suit against anyone who stands in their way. The RIAA has already
filed lawsuits against people such as Brianna LaHara, a twelve-year-old
honor student;3 Janet Bebell, a fifty-four-year-old self-described "gray-
haired, middle-aged woman" from Colorado; 4 Durwood Pickle, a seventy-
one-year-old grandfather from Texas;5 Sarah Seabury Ward, a sixty-six-
year-old grandmother from Massachusetts whom the RIAA claimed was
sharing the song "I'm a Thug" by Trick Daddy; 6 and Dr. Timothy Davis, a
Yale professor.7 They even sued a dead lady.8 Perhaps most appalling,
however, is that approximately 100 midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy
could face a court-martial for having copyrighted songs on their computer.9
You could very well be next, even if you do not personally share files over
the internet.' o
2. Grant Gross, RJAA Files 717 New File-Trading Lawsuits, InfoWorld.com, Jan. 27, 2005, at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/O1/27/HNriaanewsuits-I.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) (on
file with author).
3. Download Suit Targets 12-Year-Old, CBSNews.com, Sept. 9, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2003/09/O91tech/main572426.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
4. Jefferson Graham, RIAA Lawsuits Bring Consternation, Chaos, USA TODAY, Sept. 10, 2003,
at 4D. As Ms. Bebell pointed out, "a gray-haired, middle-aged woman going to court to defend
herself from charges that she downloaded music by a band called Incubus [would] get a laugh." Id.
5. Download Suit Targets Twelve-Year-Old, supra note 3.
6. RIAA Goes After the Wrong Gal, Wired.com, Sept. 24, 2003, http://www.wired.com/news/
digiwood/0,1412,60581,00.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author). Mrs. Ward owns an
Apple Macintosh, "which cannot even run the Kazaa file-sharing service [that she and her husband]
are accused of using illegally." Id.
7. Download Suit Targets Twelve-Year-Old, supra note 3.
8. Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, THE REGISTER, Feb. 5, 2005, http://www.
theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaasuesthedead/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) (on file with author).
In early 2005, the RIAA sued eighty-three-year-old Gertrude Walton, who passed away in December
2004, "claiming that she made more than 700 songs available on the internet." Id. The RIAA chose
to file this lawsuit even though her daughter "sent a copy of [Ms. Walton's] death certificate to
record company lawyers in response to an initial warning letter, over a week before the suit was
filed." Id. "An RIAA spokesperson said that it would try and dismiss the case." Id. (emphasis
added).
9. Noah Shachtman, Pirates of the U.S. Naval Academy, Wired.com, Nov. 25, 2002, at
http://www.wired.connews/digiwood/0,1412,56574,00.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2003) (on file
with author).
10. "The recording industry said it named as the defendant in each lawsuit the person who paid
for the household Internet account." Music Industry Settles Copyright Lawsuits Against 12-year-old
Girl, USAToday.com, at http://www.usatoday.com/techlnews/techpolicy/2003-09-09-kid-pays-
riaax.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2005). As a result, if anyone shares files by using an internet
account that you pay for, you run the very real risk of being dragged into court by the RIAA. See
infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the cassette tape hit the market in the late 1970's, sales of vinyl
records and eight-tracks went into a steep decline, eventually leading to their
near-total demise.11 Compact discs were introduced in 1982, and after a
slow start due to high prices, they eventually overtook cassettes as the
medium of choice for music. 12 However, neither of these events had any net
effect on the sales of albums by the music industry, because the music
industry kept up with the times: the sales that they lost from tapes were
replaced by the sales that they gained from compact discs (CDs). 3 With the
advent of MP3 files, history tells us to expect the decline of the outdated
form of digital media, i.e., CDs, and that is exactly what is beginning to
happen.1 4 CD sales have plummeted in recent years, but contrary to what
the recording industry would like us to think, it's not due to piracy - it is due
to the music industry's failure to keep up with technology."5 People want
their songs in MP3 format, and since the music industry is not offering it,
they have to turn elsewhere to find it.1
6
The response of the music industry, led by the RIAA, 17 has been to sue
everyone from Napster to their own customers.' 8  Part II of this Comment
will begin the process of explaining these lawsuits by providing a brief
introduction into the world of MP3s and peer-to-peer file sharing, and Part
11. See The History of Sound Recording Technology: Portable Music, About.com, http://
inventors.about.comgi/dynaniic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.recording%2Dhistory.org/ (last visited
Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
12. See The History of Sound Recording Technology: The Digital Era, About.com, http://
inventors.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.recording%2Dhistory.org/
(last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. The decline in music sales can also be partially attributed to the poor economic climate of the
last few years. See At Last, A Market Solution, BILLBOARD, Sept. 20, 2003, at 10. Other factors
include "high CD prices and substandard music." Chris Nelson, CD Sales Rise, but Industry Is Still
Wary, N.Y. TtMEs, Feb. 23, 2004, at C1.
16. Granted, a music lover could purchase a CD, and then "rip" the songs from that CD and
convert them into MP3 files, but unfortunately most people do not know how to do this. For the
average American, the only way to obtain MP3 files is to download them from their peers.
17. The RIAA "is the trade group that represents the U.S. recording industry." About Us,
Recording Industry Association of America, at http://www.riaa.com/about/default.asp (last visited
Mar. 27, 2005) (on file with author).
18. As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, starting with "the advent of the player piano, every new
means of reproducing sound has struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright owners, often
resulting in federal litigation." MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). The Grokster court went on to point out that
[t]he introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and particularly
to those copyright owners whose works are sold through well-established distribution
mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that time and market forces often provide
equilibrium in balancing interests, whether the new technology be a player piano, a
copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal computer, a karaoke machine, or an
MP3 player.
Id. at 1167. As a result of the above, "it is prudent for courts to exercise caution before restructuring
liability theories for the purpose of addressing specific market abuses, despite their apparent present
magnitude," especially since courts are "ill-suited to fix the flow of intemet innovation." Id.
950
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III will add to that foundation by summarizing the basics of copyright law.
Parts IV and V will then deal with various issues that have arisen from the
mass of litigation that has taken place over the last few years because of
these new technologies, and especially because of the failure of the music
industry to keep up with these new technologies.' 9 Lastly, Part VI will
discuss various solutions to the problems presented by the RIAA's battle
against its own customers, and also offer a few feasible alternatives to the
current soap opera of litigation that has pitted The RIAA v. The People.
H. BACKGROUND: MP3S, FILE-SHARING, AND THE DIGITAL MUSIC
REVOLUTION
A. MP3s and File-Sharing: The Technology That Started This Whole Mess
More Americans share MP3 files "than have voted in some recent
presidential elections."20 Some of these same people may soon be facing a
lawsuit by the RIAA, even though they may not understand why the music
industry is so upset about file-sharing. Before that issue is addressed,
however, a brief explanation of the underlying technology may be helpful.
1. What is an MP3?
The term "MP3" is short for "MPEG audio Layer-3., ,2  "MPEG" is an
acronym that stands for "Moving Picture Experts Group," which is a group
that has developed various techniques to compress video data so that movies
can take up less digital memory, thereby enabling an entire movie to be
stored on a single DVD.2 Since a movie consists of images as well as
sound, part of the compression process required a method to compress the
movie's sound.23  The method that the Moving Picture Experts Group
devised is known as MPEG audio Layer-3, more commonly called MP3.24
Thus, an MP3 is simply a compressed25 audio file.26
19. While finding in favor of the RIAA "would satisfy [their] immediate economic aims," the
courts have thus far been of the opinion that such a holding would not only "conflict with binding
precedent," but it would also be "unwise." Id. at 1166.
20. Barbara Quint, At War with Copyright, Information Today, Oct. 2003, at 7.
21. Marshall Brain, How MP3 Files Work, HowStuffWorks.com, at http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/mp3.htm/printable (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (on file with author).
22. Id.
23. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136, at *1, n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
24. Brain, supra note 21.
25. In plain English, compressing a file simply means reducing its size without sacrificing the
quality or completeness of the data. Tom Harris, How File Compression Works,
HowStuffWorks.com, at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/file-compression.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 2004) (on file with author).
26. Brain, supra note 21.
MP3s are created using a technique known as "perceptual noise
shaping," which applies certain "characteristics of the human ear.",
27
Perceptual noise shaping works by eliminating certain parts of a song that
the human ear cannot hear anyway.28 For example, if two or more sounds
are playing simultaneously, the human ear can only hear the louder one.29
As a result, the frequency band that accounts for the quieter sounds can be
eliminated when compressing the file into MP3 format.30 This is but one of
many "tricks" that are applied to reduce the file size of songs by eliminating
the sounds that the human ear cannot detect.3' Combining these auditory
"tricks" with other standard file compression techniques results in a file
whose size is reduced by at least a factor of ten.32
The effectiveness of this technique cannot be understated. For example,
a regular CD requires 176,000 bytes of memory to store one second of a
song,33 and considering that an average song is about three minutes long,
each song therefore takes up approximately thirty-two megabytes34 (MBs) of
hard drive space when stored in its uncompressed format. 35 The same song
compressed into an MP3 file would only take up about three MBs of digital
memory.
36
2. Why All the Fuss Over MP3s?
The most obvious advantage of MP3s is that they take up significantly
less space on your hard drive than uncompressed audio files.37 For instance,
a collection of 1,000 songs stored in an uncompressed format would take up
approximately thirty-one gigabytes (GBs) of memory - virtually your entire
hard drive. 38  That same collection in MP3 format would only take up a
miniscule three GBs on your hard drive.39
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. ld. Songs on CDs are generally stored in a file format known as "WAV," which requires
significantly more memory than MP3 files. MP3 & Digital Music Audio Guide, Viewz.com, at
http://www.viewz.com/shoppingguide/musicguide.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2004) (on file with
author).
34. One megabyte of data is equivalent to 1,048,576 bytes. Megabyte, Webopedia.com, at
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/M/megabyte.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004) (on file with
author).
35. Brain, supra note 21.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. A three-minute-long song stored in an uncompressed format requires approximately 32 MBs
of memory. See id. Thus, 1,000 such songs would require approximately 32,000 MBs of memory,
which is equivalent to 31.25 GBs. See Gigabye, Webopedia.com, at http://www.webopedia.com
TERM/G/gigabyte.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004) (on file with author) (defining one gigabyte as
the equivalent of 1,024 megabytes).
39. That same three-minute-long song stored as an MP3 would consume approximately 3 MBs
of memory. See Brain, supra note 21. Therefore, 1,000 such songs would only take up
952
[Vol. 32: 947, 2005] The RIAA v. The People
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Because of their small file size, they can easily be uploaded to portable
MP3 players.40 The current crop of portable MP3 players can hold
approximately four hours of music41 which a listener can then take with him
or her when on the go. Unlike CDs, MP3s do not "skip" when the player
gets bumped around, as may happen, for example, when he or she is
jogging.42 MP3 players, most of which fit in the palm of your hand, are also
substantially smaller and more portable than any CD player on the market.43
Last, but certainly not least, MP3s can be transferred over the internet
much more quickly than uncompressed audio files, via a process known as
file-sharing. 44 Any type of file may be shared, including text, images, and
video,45 but for the purposes of this article we are only concerned with
digital audio files. Although music files may be shared regardless of the file
format that they are stored in, MP3 files are one of the most commonly
approximately 3,000 MBs, or 2.9 GBs of digital memory. See Gigabye, supra note 38 (defining one
gigabyte as the equivalent of 1,024 megabytes).
40. For around $200, a music lover can purchase an MP3 player that holds approximately four
hours of songs recorded in MP3 format, has a built-in FM radio tuner, can function as a digital voice
recorder, and still fits in the palm of your hand. As of this writing, some of the more popular devices
that fit this description include the iRiver iFP-390T, at http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?
id= 1051806328065&skuld=5446957&type=product&productCategoryld=pcmcat 10200050002 (last
visited Jan. 25, 2004) (on file with author); MPIO's model FL100256MB digital audio player, at
http://www.bestbuy.comsite/olspage.jsp?id=1057490619280&skuld=5767388&type=product&prod
uctCategoryld=pcmcatl0200050002 (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) (on file with author); and Creative's
256MB Rhomba, at http://us.creative.comshop/shopcategory.asp?category=3 (last visited Jan. 25,
2004) (on file with author).
41. Since an uncompressed audio file requires roughly 32 MBs of memory, only eight such
songs could be stored on an MP3 player with 256 MB of memory. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
Fortunately, the MP3 format enables a listener to store approximately four hours of music, or about
eighty songs, on that same MP3 player. Id.
42. MP3s are generally stored in "flash memory" within a portable MP3 player. Brain et al.,
How MP3 Players Work, HowStuffWorks.com, at http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/mp3-
player.htm/printable (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (on file with author). Flash memory is a "solid state
storage device," which "means that there are no moving parts" associated with this type of memory;
everything is electronic, rather than mechanical. Jeff Tyson, How Flash Memory Works,
HowStuffWorks.com, at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/flash-memory.htm/printable (last
visited Mar. 1, 2004) (on file with author). Because there are no moving parts, an MP3 player with
flash memory cannot skip like a CD player, which must spin the CD in order to read it and play the
music stored on it. Brain et al., supra.
43. Most MP3 players are about three inches by five inches, and weigh only a few ounces. Brain
et al., supra note 42. Contrast this with a CD player, which must be at least as large as a CD,
meaning that it cannot possibly fit into the palm of an average person's hand.
44. Brain, supra note 21. Over a standard 56K modem, an uncompressed audio file would take
approximately two hours to download, whereas the same song in MP3 format can be transferred in a
matter of minutes. Id.
45. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035-36 (C.D. Cal.
2003), afftd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (discussing various types
of files that can be shared using P2P software, including movie trailers, books, documents, and other
media content).
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shared digital song formats, primarily because they take up less memory
than uncompressed songs.46
3. How Does File-Sharing Work?
File-sharing occurs over something called a peer-to-peer (P2P)
network,47 the most popular of which are Kazaa4 8 and Gnutella.4 9 In order to
use a P2P network such as these, one must install file-sharing software, such
as Kazaa Media Desktop,5 ° Morpheus, or WinMX, on his or her computer.5 1
Although there are technical differences between the various P2P networks,
they are all very similar.52 Without going into too much technical detail,53
file-sharing basically works as follows: First, using the "search" feature of
his or her file-sharing program of choice, the user enters the name of the
song that he or she wants to find. 4 The program then sends out a query over
its network, essentially "asking" other computers that are connected to the
same P2P network if they have the song saved on their hard drive. Based
on the responses of the other computers on the P2P network, the user's file-
sharing program builds a list of available files that satisfy the user's query.56
The user can then select a song or songs from this list to download to his or
her computer.57
B. Why Does the Digital Music Revolution Scare the Music Industry?
As was demonstrated above, MP3s are clearly superior to CDs.58
Unfortunately for audiophiles, instead of embracing this new technology, the
46. See Brain, supra note 21.
47. Napster created the original P2P network, but was forced into bankruptcy by the RIAA. See
discussion infra Part V.A. Napster has since reinvented itself as an online music store offering legal
downloads. See discussion infra Part V.A.
48. Kazaa Information Center, FileSharingWatch.com, at http://www.filesharingwatch.
com/kazaa.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (on file with author); see also Powell Fraser, Secret
Networks Protect Music Swappers, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/intemet/
07/29/private.fileshare/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (on file with author).
49. Marshall Brain, How File Sharing Works, HowStuffWorks.com, at http://computer.
howstuffworks.comlfile-sharing.htmlprintable (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (on file with author).
50. Kazaa Information Center, supra note 48. According to Kazaa.com, the Kazaa file-sharing
program has been downloaded over 383,000,000 times as of February 14, 2005. Kazaa,
http://www.kazaa.comius/index.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (on file with author).
51. Brain, supra note 49.
52. The primary difference is that, while Gnutella allows various client programs, such as
BearShare, Xolox, Limewire, Morpheus, and WinMX, to access its network, the Kazaa network can
only be accessed by users who are running the Kazaa Media Desktop family of software. See id.;
Kazaa Information Center, supra note 48; Gnutella Information Center, FileSharingWatch.com, at
http://www.filesharingwatch.com/gnutella.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (on file with author).
53. For a slightly more detailed description, see MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154, 1158-60 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
54. Brain, supra note 49.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
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music industry has missed the proverbial boat and is in quite a bind as a
result.59 Due in part to the explosion of file-sharing over the last few years,
CD sales have dramatically declined.60  The RIAA blames this decline in
sales on the fact that users can download songs for free over the internet
instead of purchasing CDs for $16.99 or more.
6 1
The reality of the situation is that MP3 technology is a significant
improvement on CDs, which until recently was the best technology that the
music industry offered its customers.62  In addition to the primary
advantages discussed above,63 there are other reasons why MP3s are vastly
superior to CDs. For instance, there is no longer any need to clutter one's
bedroom with piles of CDs; instead, a music lover can store a virtually
unlimited number of songs in a music library on his computer.
64
There are advantages from the music industry's point of view as well,
although it is just starting to realize this.65 For starters, MP3 files eliminate
the problem of unsold inventory because a record label could simply sell a
downloadable MP3 version of songs online, rather than burning CDs for sale
in a store. The flip side of this is that stores would never sell out of a CD
because every song created could be perpetually available online.
The MP3 file format also makes it very easy for new artists to distribute
their music digitally over the internet; gone forever are the days of fledgling
59. Unlike other advancements in the music industry, such as cassette tapes and CDs, MP3s are
unique in that they were brought to the forefront of the music scene by music lovers, rather than by
the music industry. Brain, supra note 21; see also A Reason to Be Upbeat, BILLBOARD, Feb. 7,
2004, at 12 (pointing out that "for the past three years, the music industry has been caught in a
classic situation where events - both economic and technological - have been driving change rather
than the industry itself").
60. See, e.g., A Reason to Be Upbeat, supra note 59 (noting that over the course of the last three
years, the music "industry has declined.., from $40 billion to $28 billion," and that "its long-
established business model, built around the sale of CDs through retail outlets, is a shambles").
61. See, e.g., David McGuire, Recording Industry Sues File Swappers, washingtonpost.com, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42637-2003Sep8?language=printer (Sept. 8, 2003)
(on file with author) (stating that file sharing is estimated to have cost the music industry "more than
a billion dollars in lost CD sales between 2000 and 2002," including $700 million in 2002 alone).
But see At Last, A Market Solution, supra note 15 (noting that the music "industry is suffering
through a sharp, three-year downturn in sales" due chiefly to "the sour economy").
62. The music industry has only recently begun to sell MP3s online. See discussion infra Part
VI.
63. See discussion supra Part I.A.
64. Since an average song stored as an MP3 only requires about 3 MBs of hard drive space, you
would only need around 2.9 GBs of digital memory to store 1,000 such songs on your computer.
See discussion supra Part ll.A.2. The hard drives on a laptop computer are typically at least 20 GB,
and it is common for a desktop to have hard drives that can hold upwards of 80 GB of memory. See,
e.g., Featured Notebook, Dell.com, at http://wwwl.us.dell.comcontent/products/features.aspx/
featured-notebooklc=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author);
Featured Systems, Dell.com, at http://www 1.us.dell.com/content/products/features.aspx/advertised-
dimen3?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
65. The music industry has just started to take advantage of the superiority of the MP3 file
format. See discussion infra Part VI.
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artists selling CDs out of the trunks of their cars.66 The music industry does
not like this, of course, because there will not be as much need for its
overpriced services.67
Instead of embracing this new technology, the recording industry has
instead attempted to use the court system to stop it.61 In order to save its
business model, the RIAA is essentially asking the courts to stop technology
from progressing.69  It is doing this by filing lawsuits against its own
66. See Brain, supra note 21 (noting that "[i]f you are an artist who is recording music at home
or in a small studio, you can use MP3 files and the Web to distribute your music to an extremely
large audience").
67. Artists typically only receive "a 15% royalty on the wholesale price" of their album. Brian
Garrity, All Aboard the Digital Train?, BILLBOARD, Sept. 20, 2003, at 23, 25. Thus, when someone
spends twenty dollars on a CD, only three of those dollars will ever make their way to the artist, who
may often have to split that profit with his or her band mates. See id. The rest of the money goes to
the record company to pay for things such as packaging, technology, and "free goods." Id. Even in
this age of online distribution of music, however, record companies still "have the chutzpah to take a
packaging deduction on a digital download sale where there is no package, [thus giving] new
meaning to the old tale about the emperor's new clothes." Samantha Chang, Stage Is Set for Battle
Royal(ties), BILLBOARD, Feb. 7, 2004, at 18 (quoting artist attorney Bob Donnelly).
As further evidence of why the recording industry would sooner sell CDs than offer digital
downloads, one commentator points out that
CD burners didn't just make it easy to copy CDs, they made people realize that CDs cost
almost nothing to make. On the same record store shelf, stacks of 30 cent blank CDs sit
next to the record companies' $16 jewel cases. And if it costs a regular person 30 cents to
make a perfect copy on their home computer, imagine how little it costs when you own a
factory. Even if you've never burned a CD in your life, you feel like an idiot paying $16
for CDs when you know you don't have to anymore. Furthermore, people know a lot
more these days about how the music industry works - at least they understand that not
much of the $16 ends up in musician's hands. We've all watched multi-platinum bands
on Behind the Music file for bankruptcy before they realize how much of a scam their
record contract was.
Civil Disobedience, p2p, DownHillBattle.org, at http:/lwww.downhillbattle.org/articles/civil.php?
PHPSESSID=7acafb38083daa6cc954f, Aug. 26, 2003 (last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (on file with
author).
68. The music industry shut down Napster, the first file-sharing program. A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Then the industry began to sue its own customers.
See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Serv's, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004). It is currently trying to shut down the new wave of file-
sharing programs as well. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(C.D. Cal. 2003), aftd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). These cases
will be discussed in greater detail in Parts IV and V of this Comment.
69. In the Sony case, for example, the Supreme Court reasoned that:
It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon all copyright
owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this case, the exclusive right to
distribute [VCRs] simply because they may be used to infringe copyrights. That,
however, is the logical implication of their claim. The request for an injunction below
indicates that respondents seek, in effect, to declare [VCRs] contraband.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 n.21 (1984). This sentiment
was echoed in the Grokster appeal by Michael Page, the attorney who represented Grokster at oral
arguments before the Ninth Circuit:
Regulating technologies in their infancy is a bad idea. Imagine had the Supreme Court
agreed with appellants [in the Sony case] and had said that VCR's [sic] are illegal ....
Today, VCR's [sic] gamer more income for the music industry than movies. They would
not exist had the studios gotten their wish and had them banned. They told the world that
the VCR was to copyright as the Boston Strangler is to a woman alone at home and
predicted that it would be the death of copyright. This is not a new theme. Every time a
new technology comes along, those with a vested interest in the old technology first ask
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customers for direct copyright infringement, 70 and also by attempting to shut
down the file-sharing services themselves through litigation based on
theories of secondary copyright infringement. 71 Before the issues presented
by these lawsuits can be analyzed, however, a brief primer on the basics of
copyright law is necessary.
III. A PRIMER ON COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Copyright Protection
A copyright protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression., 72  Musical works, including the lyrics of a song,
qualify as a "work of authorship, '73  and are thus afforded copyright
protection 74 as long as they are both "original" and "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.77 5  In order for a work to be fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, "its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord... [must
be] sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,
the courts to ban it. Thankfully, the courts say no, and when they do, the copyright
holders then find a way to make money off that new technology. Because every time
technology removes the transaction costs between the artists and the consumer, that
leaves money available for the artists. Radio was going to be the death of copyright.
[The music industry said,] "How can we compete with free? You're sending our music
out into the airwaves for free for anyone to have." But when courts decline to stop
technology, people find a way to develop those technologies to further develop non-
infringing uses of those technologies, and to monetize them, and in the long run it is
always good for the consumers and the copyright holders. Efficiency is good for
everybody, and these systems are simply more efficient versions of distribution. They
have now reduced distribution costs, not low, but to zero. Courts should not step in and
stop that progress.
Oral Argument of Respondents, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, Nos. 03-55894 & 03-56236
(9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=
20040823002045984 (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (oral argument on file with author in MP3 format).
70. See, e.g., Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1229.
71. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 1069 (2004); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004; Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1029.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
73. Id. § 102(a)(2).
74. A copyright automatically attaches to a qualifying work at the instant that it is created; no
paperwork has to be filed in order for the copyright to attach. See id. § 408(a) (pointing out that
registration of a copyright is "permissive" because it "is not a condition of copyright protection");
see also MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 7.4 (3d ed. 1999) ("Copyright
protection begins not with registration, but when an author creates a work by fixing it in a tangible
medium of expression."). However, most artists register their works with the United States
Copyright Office because doing so is a prerequisite for bringing an action for infringement. See 17
U.S.C. § 411 (a) (stating that "no action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work
shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this
title").
75. Id. § 102(a).
957
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. 76
As such, a copyright clearly attaches to any original song, whether stored on
a cassette tape, CD, or as a digital audio file on your computer or portable
MP3 player.77
B. Copyright Infringement
Certain "exclusive rights" are afforded to the owner of a copyright,
78
including, inter alia, 7 the rights to both "reproduce the copyrighted work"
and "to distribute copies... of the copyrighted work., 80  Copyright
infringement occurs whenever any of these exclusive rights are violated by
another person.8' Three types of copyright infringement exist: direct,
contributory, and vicarious.8 2
Direct infringement occurs whenever someone personally "violates any
of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner., 83  For purposes of this
Comment, the best examples of direct infringement are reproducing a
copyrighted song by downloading a copy of it from someone else's
computer and distributing a copyrighted song in MP3 format by sharing it
over a P2P network.84  Because intent is not an element of direct
infringement, it is not a valid defense for the infringer to say that he was
76. Id. § 101. A "phonorecord" is a material object "in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id.
77. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Serv's, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating that Verizon customers were suspected of infringing copyrights by sharing
MP3 files), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th
Cit. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004) (finding that Aimster users directly infringed
copyrights by sharing MP3 files); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding that Napster users directly infringed copyrights by sharing MP3 files).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
79. See id. § 106 (listing all the exclusive rights of a copyright owner).
80. Id. § 106(1), (3).
81. Id. § 501(a). There are several limitations on these exclusive fights, the most important of
which is the doctrine of "fair use." Id. § 107. The other limitations are codified at sections 108
through 112 of Title 17 of the United States Code. These limitations generally do not pertain to the
file-sharing issues discussed within this Comment, although Napster unsuccessfully raised the "fair
use" defense in their litigation with A&M Records. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-19. For an
excellent discussion of the aforementioned limitations on a copyright holder's exclusive rights, see
Michael J. Remington, Esq., Education Task Force of the Joint Committee of the Higher Education
and Entertainment Communities, Background Discussion of Copyright Law and Potential Liability
for Students Engaged in P2P File Sharing on University Networks, available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2PlP2PJointConmitee.paper.pdf, and http://www.acenet.edu/
washington/legalupdate/2003/P2P.pdf#xmi=http://acenet.eduSCRPTS/texis.exeWebinator/search
xml.txt?query=copyright+remington&pr=ACEnet&order=dd&cq=&id=4025cd0715 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2004) (on file with author).
82. See Remington, supra note 81, at 5; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a); see also Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 457-62; Remington, supra note 81, at 5;
Fred von Lohmann, IAAL: What Peer-to-Peer Developers Need to Know About Copyright Law (v.
3.0), EFF.org, Dec. 2003, at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/p2p-copyright wp.php (last visited Feb. 10,
2004) (on file with author).
84. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
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unaware that he was sharing the song.85 This is particularly worrisome
because the RIAA itself admits that "the majority of the users [of the various
file-sharing programs] were unable to tell what files they were sharing, and
sometimes incorrectly assumed they were not sharing any files when in fact
they were sharing all [of the] files on their hard drive., 86
Unlike direct infringement, which makes a person answer for his own
infringing actions, contributory and vicarious liability are ways to hold a
person liable for an infringement committed by someone else.87
Contributory infringement is copyright law's answer to the criminal act of
aiding and abetting.88 In addition to proving that someone directly infringed
upon his copyright, 89 a copyright owner must allege two elements to
establish a prima facie case of contributory infringement: (1) knowledge9°
and (2) material contribution. 9 The first of these elements requires that the
defendant had either actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing
activity.92 The second element, which is much simpler than the first, merely
requires that the defendant facilitated, encouraged, assisted, or otherwise
85. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that
"innocent intent is generally not a defense to copyright infringement"); Ford Motor Co. v. B & H
Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975, 989 (D. Minn. 1986) ("Intent is not an element of copyright
infringement and, thus, absence of intent is not a valid defense to a claim of copyright
infringement."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (stating that "[alnyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright" without making any
mention of intent); Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54
RUTGERS L. REv. 351, 356 (2002) (pointing out that courts "have consistently held that intent to
infringe is irrelevant in determining liability for copyright infringement").
86. Backgrounder News Memo Debunkihg Myths Raised by Verizon in Court Dispute,
RIAA.com, at http://www.riaa.com/news/filings/verizonbackgrounder.asp (last visited Jan. 25,
2004) (on file with author) (internal quotations omitted).
87. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-35. Even though "[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render
anyone liable for infringement committed by another," the Sony Court noted that "[tlhe absence of
such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for
copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing
activity." Id.
88. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
1069 (2004).
89. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 686 (2004).
90. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-22 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160; Remington, supra note 81, at 5 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
91. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022; see also Remington, supra note
81, at 5 (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162). In order to establish "material contribution," the
copyright holder must prove that the defendant "cause[d] or materially contribute[d] to the infringing
conduct of' the third-party. See von Lohmann, supra note 83.
92. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 487 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "a finding of contributory
infringement has never depended on actual knowledge of particular instances of infringement; it is
sufficient that the defendant have reason to know that infringement is taking place"); see also
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 (noting that "[c]ontributory liability requires that the secondary infringer
'know or have reason to know' of direct infringement").
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materially contributed to the infringing activity.93  It is the file-sharing
programs - rather than the people who are actually sharing the files - that
are generally forced to defend claims of contributory infringement. 94
Vicarious infringement stems from the legal principle of respondeat
superior.95 Like a claim of contributory infringement, a copyright owner
alleging vicarious infringement must also prove that someone directly
infringed upon his copyright.96 In addition, there are two other elements to a
claim of vicarious infringement: (1) financial interest and (2) supervision. 97
The first element, which is rather straightforward (at least for our purposes),
requires that the defendant received a direct financial benefit from the
activity in question.98 The second element, which is more controversial,
requires that the defendant had "the right and ability to supervise its users'
conduct." 99 Unlike contributory infringement, a person can be held liable
under this theory even if he is "completely unaware of [the] infringing
activity."' °  Similar to contributory infringement, the issue of vicarious
infringement often rears its ugly head in cases involving the file-sharing
programs themselves.'10
1. The Betamax Defense
The "Betamax defense" arises from Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., a 1984 case involving the Sony Betamax video tape
recorder. 10 2  In a groundbreaking decision, 10 3 the United States Supreme
93. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019; see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendants "materially contributed to the infringing activity" where "it
would [have been] difficult for the infringing activity to take place in the massive quantities alleged
without the support services provided by" them).
94. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 1069 (2004); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004; MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also discussion infra Part V.
95. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262); see also von Lohmann, supra
note 83 ("Vicarious infringement is derived from the same legal principle that holds an employer
responsible for the actions of its employees."). Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine that holds an
employer liable for the wrongful acts that his employee committed within the scope of his
employment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999).
96. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164; see also Gordon v. Nextel Communications, 345 F.3d 922, 925
(6th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[v]icarious liability exists when (1) a defendant has the right and ability
to supervise the infringing conduct [of another] and (2) the defendant has an obvious and direct
financial interest in the infringement"); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (stating substantially the same rule
as Gordon); see also von Lohmann, supra note 83.
97. Gordon, 345 F.3d at 925; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022-24; see also von Lohmann, supra note
83.
98. Gordon, 345 F.3d at 925; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022-24; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262; see also
von Lohmann, supra note 83.
99. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
100. von Lohmann, supra note 83.
101. See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004; MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
102. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
103. The Sony Court referred to the respondents' "attempt to impose copyright liability upon the
distributors of copying equipment" as "unprecedented." Id. at 421.
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Court refused to hold Sony liable for the actions of customers who used their
video tape recorders in an infringing manner.04' In denying the
respondents' 0 5  allegations that Sony had committed contributory
infringement, 0 6 the Court established what has since become known as the
Betamax defense.'0 7 Under this doctrine, "the sale of copying equipment,
like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes.. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses" in order for its producer to have a defense to an allegation of
contributory infringement. 0 8  The Sony Court found that the video tape
recorders' ability to "time-shift"' 9 qualified as a substantial noninfringing
use and, as a result, held that Sony was not guilty of contributory
infringement." 0
104. Id.
105. Walt Disney Productions joined Universal City Studios, Inc., in bringing this case against
Sony. Id.
106. Although the respondents did not allege that Sony had committed vicarious infringement,
the Court observed
that reasoned analysis of respondents' unprecedented contributory infringement claim
necessarily entails consideration of arguments and case law which may also be forwarded
under the [the labels of direct and vicarious infringement], and indeed the parties to a
large extent rely upon such arguments and authority in support of their respective
positions on the issue of contributory infringement.
Id. at 435 n.17. The Sony court thus provided an in-depth discussion of the doctrine of vicarious
infringement within their analysis of the contributory infringement claim. Id. at 439. Since the issue
of vicarious infringement was not before the court, however, the discussion pertaining to it was
merely non-binding dicta. See id.
107. von Lohmann, supra note 83. The Betamax defense instructs us that the sale or distribution
of a product "does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes." Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. The Court reasoned:
It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon all copyright
owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this case, the exclusive right to
distribute VTR's [sic] simply because they may be used to infringe copyrights. That,
however, is the logical implication of their claim. The request for an injunction below
indicates that respondents seek, in effect, to declare VTR's [sic] contraband.
Id. at 441 n.21. The Sony court repeatedly referred to the Betamax as a VTR, short for "video tape
recorder." See generally id. at 417. At least for our purposes, there is no more difference between a
VTR and a VCR than there is between the AM and FM bands on a radio dial: They both accomplish
the same purpose, they just do it in a slightly different manner. See Betamax, Wikipedia: The Free
Encyclopedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betamax (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (on file with
author) (providing an excellent comparison of the Betamax and VHS formats, and explaining why
the former failed even though it is still considered to be vastly superior to the latter). As one can
easily determine from reading this article, the terms "VTR" and "VCR" are used interchangeably.
108. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. It is worth noting that the Betamax defense does not extend to claims
of vicarious infringement. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-23
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting that, since the issue of vicarious liability was not before the Sony court, any
discussion thereof was only non-binding dicta).
109. "Time-shifting" is the act of using a VCR to record a program that is being televised at a time
when the VCR owner cannot watch it, in order for that person to be able to watch it later. Sony, 464
U.S. at 421.
110. Id. at442,456.
The Betamax defense is of great importance to the litigation pertaining
to the legality of various file-sharing programs.1"' This doctrine, which has
been applied inconsistently by various federal appellate courts,' 12 was
recently revisited by the Supreme Court. it3 The Court's Grokster opinion is
expected in July 2005 14 and will undoubtedly have profound effects on the
file-sharing community for years to come.
IV. BASIC FILE-SHARING RIGHTS
As demonstrated above, there are two basic categories of infringement:
direct and secondary." 5 The RIAA uses theories of secondary infringement
in its attempt to shut down the makers of P2P file-sharing software. 116 In
contrast to this, it is the file-sharers themselves who may face allegations of
direct infringement for sharing MP3 files." 7
A. Why Is It Illegal to Share MP3s, and What Are the Penalties for Doing
So?
It is not illegal to share MP3s per se; it's only illegal to share MP3s that
are digital recordings of copyrighted songs."i 8 Sharing a copyrighted song is
111. See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019-22; In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647-54
(7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1035-43 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
112. In its recent Grokster decision, the Ninth Circuit was "mindful that the Seventh Circuit has
read Sony's substantial noninfringing use standard differently." MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 n.9 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). Under the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of the Betamax doctrine, plaintiffs may get around the teachings of Sony if
they can demonstrate that the makers of a product with substantial noninfringing uses "had
reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files and failed to act on that knowledge to prevent
infringement." Id. at 1161. Further adding to the confusion, the Ninth Circuit stated in its earlier
Napster decision that "[r]egardless of the number of Napster's infringing versus noninfringing uses,
the evidentiary record here supported the district court's finding that plaintiffs would likely prevail
in establishing that Napster knew or had reason to know of its users' infringement of plaintiffs'
copyrights." Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
In contrast to the above, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has stated that "[tlhe Supreme
Court made clear in the Sony decision that the producer of a product that has substantial non-
infringing uses is not a contributory infringer merely because some of the uses actually made of the
product ... are infringing." Ainster, 334 F.3d at 647. The Fifth Circuit also spoke on this doctrine
in 1988, opining that the Sony "Court held that.., the sale of a product 'does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes."'
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at
442).
113. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the Grokster litigation on March 29, 2005, and a
ruling is expected by the end of the 2004-2005 term. Jonathan Krim, Court Weighs File Sharing;
Technology Advances vs. Copyrights in Grokster Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2005, at E01.
114. Id.
115. See supra Part III.B.
116. See infra Part V (discussing the legality of file-sharing programs).
117. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Serv's, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004).
118. Eliot Van Buskirk, The RIAA Lawsuits Clairified Once and for All, CNET.com, Sept. 24,
2003, at http://reviews.cnet.con/4520-6450_7-5081098-1.html?tag=txt (last visited Feb. 3, 2004)
(on file with author). Although it is also illegal to download copyrighted music files, the RIAA is
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a violation of copyright law, which has its basis in Article I of the U.S.
Constitution,1 9 and is also codified in Title 17 of the United States Code.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) specifically
extended copyright protection to cover, inter alia, digital media and the
internet.2 0
Illegally sharing a copyrighted song is an example of direct
infringement.' 2' The statutory penalty for direct infringement may be as
high as $150,000 per infringed work if the infringement was willful, 22 and
may also include injunctive relief,123 impoundment and possible destruction
of the equipment used to commit the infringing activity,' 24 and evenimprisonment. 25
Because the potential penalties for copyright infringement are so great,
defendants are generally forced to settle their lawsuits out of court. 26 This
is especially true since all of the RIAA's lawsuits to date have been aimed at
people who are accused of sharing an average of 800 songs, 27 meaning that
not currently interested in prosecuting people for downloading music. Id. Rather, it is focusing its
current efforts on suing people who are sharing large numbers of copyrighted songs. Id.
119. Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
120. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, Dec. 1998,
available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). President
Clinton signed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) into law on October 28, 1998. Id. at
1. The purpose of the DMCA was to implement "two 1996 World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) treaties: the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty. The DMCA also addresses a number of other significant copyright-related
issues," including "the 'Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act,"' which is codified
as Title I of the DMCA. Id. Among other things, Title II added a new and much maligned
"procedure by which a copyright owner can obtain a subpoena from a federal court ordering [an ISP]
to disclose the identity of a subscriber who is allegedly engaging in infringing activities." Id. at 9
(emphasis added). This procedure is codified at Section 512(h) of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(h),
and is the subject of an in depth discussion in Part IV.C. I of this Comment.
121. See Remington, supra note 81, at 5.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
123. Id. § 502.
124. Id. § 503.
125. Id. § 506(a) (punishing offenders with imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2319). As
one prominent attorney noted, such a stiff penalty "doesn't seem like a proportional response. And it
doesn't help get artists paid... either." Shachtman, supra note 9. Fred von Lohmann is an expert in
the field of copyright law, particularly as it applies to file-sharing. See Fred von Lohmann, Senior
Intellectual Property Attorney, EFF.org, at http://www.eff.org/homes/fred vonlohmann.html (last
visited Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with author). He represented Streamcast networks in the Grokster
litigation. Id.
126. See, e.g., File Traders in Court, MP3newswire.net, at http://www.mp3newswire.net/storiesl
target.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (on file with author). However, at least two men have plead
guilty to federal file-sharing charges. Jon Healey, 2 Plead Guilty in Piracy Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2005, at C6, available at http://www.latimes.com/technology/la-fi-piracyl9janl9,1,3041155.
story (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). Both men "face up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine."
Id.
127. Katie Dean, New Flurry of RIAA Lawsuits, Wired.com, Feb. 17, 2004, at http://www.wired.
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if a defendant were to fight the RIAA and lose he could be looking at a
potential fine in the neighborhood of $120,000,00.128 Keker & Van Nest
attorney Michael Page summed up the situation perfectly, stating that he
would "love to see one of [the people sued for sharing copyrighted songs]
take on the RIAA, but the reality is it just does not make economic
sense .... It would be a martyrdom mission."'
' 29
Thus far, the RIAA seems more than willing to settle the lawsuits out of
court.130  Most of the settlements have been "for between $2,000 and
$5,000,,,13' although penalties have ranged at least as high as $25,000 and
two years of probation.132  In settling the lawsuits, however, the RIAA
makes the accused file-sharers admit liability, which may in turn open the
door for the government to bring criminal penalties against them.
33
Admitting liability could also be a tool for the actual copyright owner to
bring a civil suit against the alleged file-sharer.
34
B. How Does the RIAA Determine Whom to Sue?
In order to go after individual file-sharers, the RIAA must first identify
which parties to sue. 135  The initial step in this process is to obtain the
"screen name"'136 of a user who the RIAA thinks is sharing a large number of
com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62318,00.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
128. A fine of $150,000 per violation multiplied by 800 violations gives us the astronomical
figure of $120,000,000. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
129. Jason Krause, Chinks in the Recording Industry's Armor, ABA Journal e-Report, Sept. 19,
2003 (on file with author).
130. See, e.g., Jason Straziuso, Download Lawsuits Scare Some, but Song Trading Still Popular,
USAToday.com, at http://www.usatoday.comltechlwebguide/music/2004-02-20-song-swaps~x.htm
(Feb. 20, 2004) (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author) (noting that 1,445 people have been
sued by the RIAA since September 2003, most of whom have settled "for an average of $3,000
each"). Perhaps this is, at least in part, a wise public relations move on the part of the RIAA. A trial
would bring a great deal of media coverage, much of which undoubtedly would be negative towards
the RIAA. Even worse for the RIAA is the very real prospect of jury nullification: at least according
to a poll taken between March and May of 2003, "a striking 67% of Internet users who download
music say they do not care about whether the music they have downloaded is copyrighted." See
Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart, Music Downloading, File-sharing and Copyright, Pew Internet
& American Life Project, July 2003, at http://www.pewintemet.org/reports/pdfs/PIPCopyright_
Memo.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). If anywhere close to sixty-seven percent of the general
population shares this disdain for the music industry's copyright war, it could be virtually impossible
to convince all twelve people on a criminal jury to find a file-sharing defendant guilty.
131. Krause, supra note 129. For example, Brianna LaHara and her mother were forced to settle
"with the RIAA for $2,000" to avoid a potential multi-million dollar verdict. McGuire, supra note
61.
132. File Traders in Court, supra note 126. According to this article, twenty-two-year-old Jeffrey
Gerard Levy initially faced a potential penalty of "[t]hree years in prison and a $250,000 fine for
trading 300 song files." Id. Mr. Levy was forced to plead guilty, incurring a large fine in the
process, in order to avoid jail time. Id.
133. Krause, supra note 129.
134. See id. The record labels which fund the RIAA generally do not own the copyrights that they
are accusing people of infringing upon. Id.
135. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Serv's, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1232 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004).
136. A screen name is an alias or a "handle" used to protect the real identity of internet users.
Screen Name, searchWebServices.com, at http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/
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copyrighted songs. 137 The RIAA accomplishes this by manipulating the P2P
programs that it so detests. 138 Once it obtains a screen name, it can use "the
Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with that screen name" to trace that
user to his Internet Service Provider (ISP), such as AOL, Earthlink, or
Verizon. 139 The RIAA then needs the help of the ISP to connect that IP
address to the person who was using the screen name in question.
140
While this process may seem straightforward, there are many problems
that result from it. The most controversial of these issues arose from the
way that the RIAA initially attempted to use section 512(h) of the DMCA
141
to obtain the personal information of the file-sharers that it wished to sue.
142
Additionally, even though the RIAA may be able to determine what
computer was used to commit the infringing activity, there is no way to be
certain who was using that computer at the time in question.
143
1. Problems with Section 512(h)
In its first two rounds of lawsuits, the RIAA used section 512(h) of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to try to force the ISPs to
provide the personal information that it desired.' 44 Section 512(h) authorizes
the issuance of a subpoena if a copyright owner (or his agent) merely
requests "the clerk of any United States district court to issue [such] a
subpoena,"''45 as long as the copyright owner or his agent filed the following
three items along with his request:' 46 (1) "a notification of claimed
infringement" that meets the rather minimal requirements of subsection
(c)(3)(A); 147 (2) "a proposed subpoena;', 148 and (3) a sworn declaration that
the subpoena is being sought for the purpose of obtaining "the identity of an
sDefinition/O,,sid26_gci833124,00.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
137. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1232.
138. See Frequently Asked Questions About the Recording Industry's Use of "John Doe"
Lawsuits, RIAA.com, at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/012104-faq.asp (last visited Mar. 1,
2004) (on file with author) (explaining how the RIAA collects evidence against file-sharers).
139. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1232.
140. Id.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h).
142. See infra notes 146-79 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
144. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1232. The RIAA attempted to use section 512(h) in this manner while
filing its first two rounds of lawsuits. Dean, supra note 127. Since Judge Ginsburg issued his
appellate ruling in Verizon, the RIAA has apparently retreated from this position, finally deciding to
play by the same rules as the rest of the world. Id. In its third and fourth rounds of lawsuits, the
R1AA filed suit against John Does identified by their IP address. Id. After a lawsuit is properly
filed, the RIAA can then use the standard subpoena procedure to obtain the personal information it
needs from the ISP.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1).
146. Id. § 512(h)(2).
147. Id. § 512(h)(2)(A), (c)(3)(A).
148. Id. § 512(h)(2)(B).
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alleged infringer and that such information will only be used for the purpose
of protecting" the copyright holder's rights. 49 Assuming that the subpoena
request satisfies these minimal requirements, the clerk must "expeditiously
issue and sign the proposed subpoena and return it to the requester for
delivery to the" ISp. 150
Numerous legal issues have arisen pertaining to section 512(h), which
has been perhaps the most controversial provision of the DMCA. 5' The
most important of those issues was the claim by the ISPs that section 512(h)
did not apply to them. 152 Additionally, the ISPs also claimed that section
512(h) was unconstitutional. 5 3 It is worth noting at this point that, in the
wake of the RIAA's use of "John Doe" lawsuits in its last two rounds of
149. Id. § 512(h)(2)(C).
150. Id. § 512(h)(4).
151. In addition to the issues discussed in depth in the main text of Part IV.C.1, there was also
another minor issue created by the RIAA's usage of section 512(h): What are the jurisdictional limits
of subpoenas issued pursuant to that section?
In the sister cases of Boston College v. Recording Industry Association of America, Misc. Act.
No. I:03-MC-10210-JLT (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAA-v-
bc-order-to-quash.pdf, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Recording Industry Association
of America, Misc. Act. No. 1:03-MC-10209-JLT (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAA-v-mit-order-to-quash.pdf, the Massachusetts District Court held
that FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2) and (b)(2) govern subpoenas issued under section 512(h) of the DMCA.
In both of these cases, the RIAA obtained subpoenas from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, pursuant to section 512(h) of the DMCA. Katie Dean, Schools Rebuke Music
Biz Demands, July 23, 2003, Wired.com, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/
0,1412,59726,00.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (on file with author). The RIAA then served the
subpoenas on the two Massachusetts schools, seeking personal information about students suspected
of illegally sharing copyrighted music files. Id.
Both schools simultaneously challenged the subpoenas on the ground that they violated the
aforementioned Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since "they were served on [the respective schools
in] Massachusetts, outside the district of the District Court for the District of Columbia, from which
the subpoena was issued, and more than 100 miles from Washington, D.C., the place designated for
production." Motion of Boston College to Quash Subpoenas and for a Protective Order Pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A), In re Subpoenas to Boston College, Misc. Act. Nos. 1:03-MS00259,
1:03-MS00278, and 1:03-MC00872, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/bostonl.pdf (on file
with author); see also Motion of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to Quash Subpoena and
for a Protective Order Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A), In re Subpoena to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Misc. Act. No. 1:03-MS-002, available at http://www.eff.org/LP/P2P/mit-
quash.pdf (on file with author).
In separate Orders, each of which was one paragraph long, the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts agreed with the schools that the subpoenas did indeed violate the
aforementioned Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Quash
Subpoena and for Protective Order, Boston Coll. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Misc. Act. No.
I:03-MC-10210-JLT (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAA-v-bc-
order-to-quash.pdf (on file with author); Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Subpoena and
for Protective Order, Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Misc. Act. No. 1:03-MC-
10209-JLT (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAA-v-mit-order-to-
quash.pdf (on file with author). At least from the point of view of the Massachusetts District Court,
it appears that section 512(h) subpoenas are only valid in the district in which they are issued.
152. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Serv's, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1231 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004).
153. Id.
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lawsuits, the legality of section 512(h) is not as important as it was just a few
short months ago.
5 4
a. Section 512(h) Does Not Apply to Internet Service Providers
Some Internet Service Providers refused to comply with the subpoenas,
choosing instead to challenge their validity in federal court.155 Leading the
way was Verizon, which filed suit against the RIAA in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia.5 6 Following hot on their heels were
Pacific Bell'5 7 and Charter Communications. 5 8  All three of these ISPs
challenged the subpoenas on both statutory and constitutional grounds.' 59
The instant section of this Comment is concerned only with their statutory
argument; the ISPs constitutional arguments will be discussed later.
Verizon argued that "[section] 512(h) does not authorize the issuance of
a subpoena to an ISP acting solely as a conduit for communications the
content of which is detennined by others. ' ' 6  In other words, Verizon
contended that section 512(h) only authorized subpoenas to be served on
ISPs who actually stored infringing material on their servers.' 6' Based on
this reasoning, Verizon argued that section 512(h) should not apply to them
because they did not store any infringing materials on their servers; they
merely provided an internet connection for users who happened to store
infringing material on their own computers.1
62
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with
Verizon. 163 In overturning the district court, the appellate court first looked
to the text of the statute itself. 64 The court concluded that, based on both the
"terms" and "structure" of the statute, section 512(h) does not apply to ISPs
that function as "a mere conduit."'' 6 Judge Ginsburg went so far as to opine
154. These lawsuits may raise new legal issues, however, especially pertaining to jurisdiction and
where a plaintiff can force a file-sharer to go in order to defend a lawsuit. See Dean, supra note 127.
155. See, e.g., Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1231.
156. Id. at 1229.
157. Compl., Pac. Bell Internet Servs. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., No. C-03-3560 (SI)
(N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/PacBell_v_RIAA.
pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Pac. Bell Compl.].
158. Mot. to Quash Subpoena Served by Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.,
In re Charter Comm., Inc., Misc. Act. No. 4:03MC00273CEJ (E.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2003), available at h
ttp://www.eff.orgIP/P2P/20031003_motionto-quash.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Charter Comm. Mot. to Quash].
159. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1229; Pac. Bell Compl., supra note 157; Charter Comm. Mot. to Quash,
supra note 158.
160. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1231.
161. Id. at 1233.
162. Id. at 1235.
163. Id. at 1236.
164. Id. at 1234.
165. Id. at 1234-37.
that the RIAA's "argument borders upon the silly. The details of [their]
argument need not burden the Federal Reporter... ,$166
The RIAA also argued that the legislative history of the DMCA
supported its claim that section 512(h) was meant to apply to the current
situation. 167  Although it was unnecessary to reach a conclusion on this
argument, 68 the court nonetheless pointed out that "the legislative history of
the DMCA betrays no awareness whatsoever that intemet users might be
able directly to exchange files containing copyrighted works. 169  The
court's reasoning on this point was very straightforward: "P2P software was
'not even a glimmer in anyone's eye when the DMCA was enacted.', 1 70 As
such, "Congress had no reason to foresee the application of § 512(h) to P2P
file sharing, nor did they draft the DMCA broadly enough to reach the new
technology when it came along."'' 71
Lastly, the RIAA tried to argue that "Verizon's interpretation of the
statute 'would defeat the core objectives' of the [DMCA]."' 72 Although the
Court of Appeals expressed sympathy for "the RIAA's concern regarding
the widespread infringement of its members' copyrights," and also
recognized "the need for legal tools to protect those rights," it correctly
concluded that it was up to Congress to make any necessary changes to the
law; the province of the judicial system is merely to interpret those laws, not
to change them. 173
b. Section 512(h) May Not Be Constitutional
In addition to the above statutory argument, there are at least three
reasons why Section 512(h) may not be constitutional: (1) an Article III
court, specifically a federal district court, does not have the power to issue a
subpoena unless there is an underlying "case or controversy;"'' 74 (2) section
512(h) violates the First Amendment because it does not sufficiently protect
the privacy rights of internet users; 75 and (3) it violates due process.176 To
date, no court has ruled on the constitutionality of Section 512(h). 77
166. Id. at 1236.
167. Id. at 1237.
168. Id. The court noted that "[Ilegislative history can serve to inform the court's reading of an
otherwise ambiguous text; it cannot lead the court to contradict the legislation itself." Id.
169. Id. at 1238.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1231.
175. Id.
176. Note that this argument was not actually advanced by Verizon; rather, it was advanced only
by the amici so the court did not actually consider it. See
Br. of Amici Curiae in Support of Verizon's Opp'n to Mot. to Enforce Subpoena, In re Verizon
Internet Servs., Inc., Misc. Act. No. 1:02ms00323 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.ef
f.org/legal/cases/RIAA-v_Verizon/20020913_ccia_amicus_brief.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
177. Since Verizon was decided on statutory grounds, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals did not discuss any of these constitutional arguments. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1231.
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Moreover, since the RIAA appears to have abandoned its use of section
512(h) in favor of John Doe lawsuits, 78 there is a very good possibility that
no court will ever have to rule on these issues, at least not in the context of
file-sharing. Since these issues appear to be moot, at least for the
foreseeable future, this Comment will not provide an in-depth discussion of
them. 1
79
2. "It Wasn't Me" - An Old Defense to a Modern Charge
As mentioned above, the RIAA is able to obtain the IP address of the
computer where the infringing activity took place, and it can then subpoena
the ISP to find out the personal information of the user, based on that IP
address.' 80 In reality, however, all that the ISP can provide is the personal
information of the user whose name is on the internet account; short of one
family member testifying against another, or a roommate turning in his best
friend,'8 ' there is no way for the RIAA to prove that the person who pays for
the internet account was actually the one that was downloading the files.
As a result, unsuspecting parents may be sued for the actions of their
children.' 82 It is one thing to hold a parent accountable if his mischievous
son vandalizes his neighbor's yard; it is something entirely different to
subject that parent to potential fines in the millions of dollars because his son
shared music over the internet. 83 Even worse is that the RIAA itself admits
that "the majority of the users ... were unable to tell what files they were
sharing, and sometimes incorrectly assumed they were not sharing any files
when in fact they were sharing all files on their hard drive."' 4  If
178. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 127.
179. A sufficient analysis of these issues would require an amount of coverage that would be
vastly disproportionate to the current importance of the issue. This is particularly true since no court
has spoken on the constitutionality of section 512(h). If the reader is interested in a more thorough
analysis of the arguments surrounding these issues, he should read the briefs available at RJAA v.
Verizon Case Archive, EFF.org, at http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/RIAA-V_Verizon/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2004) (on file with author).
180. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1231-33.
181. Even so, the evidence would likely only be circumstantial; the roommate whose name was on
the account would most likely not be able to say for sure exactly who was using the account at the
date and time in question.
182. "The recording industry said it named as the defendant in each lawsuit the person who paid
for the household Internet account." Music Industry Settles Copyright Lawsuit Against 12-year-old
Girl, supra note 10.
183. Apparently some of our congressmen do not see the problem with this: Senator Orrin Hatch
said, "Yes, there will be kids [named in the lawsuits], but we think it's great that it lets parents know
what their kids are doing when they're downloading." Bill Holand, Congress: Support Grows,
BILLBOARD, Sept. 20, 2003, 1, at 78 (internal quotations omitted). Texas Representative Lamar
Smith echoed Senator Hatch's lack of concern for who gets sued: "Whatever the age [of the person
being sued], it's still wrong.... Parents still need to take responsibility for a child's action." Id. at
79.
184. Backgrounder News Memo Debunking Myths Raised by Verizon in Court Dispute, supra note
86.
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technologically savvy teens may not realize that they are sharing songs, their
pre-digital revolution parents will certainly have no clue. However, if the
parents are the ones that are going to get sued and face astronomical fines
because of their children's behavior, their only recourse will be to prohibit
their children from using the internet. This is certainly not the result that we
want, nor is it something that we can even chance. While this result may
save the recording industry's current business model, it will sacrifice the
technological future of America's children in the process.
85
C. How Does the RIAA's "Amnesty" Program Work, and What's Wrong
with It?
The RIAA is willing "to grant what amounts to amnesty to P2P users
who voluntarily identify themselves and pledge to stop illegally sharing
music on the Internet.' 't 6  In accordance with this amnesty program, 
87
"[t]he RIAA will guarantee not to sue file sharers who have not yet been
identified' by the RIAA, and who promise in writing to stop sharing
copyrighted songs online. 88 As of this writing, at least "1,054 former file
sharers have" taken the RIAA up on this offer.
189
At first glance, this seems like a reasonable offer on the part of the
RIAA, but upon closer examination it becomes obvious that the amnesty
program is not all that it is cracked up to be. According to the complaint
filed in Parke v. Recording Industry Association of America, this program is
an "unlawful, misleading, and fraudulent" business practice.' 90
The Parke complaint characterizes the RIAA's "guarantee" of amnesty
as "hollow and deceptive" because the Clean Slate Program 91 does not
provide any "real legally binding assurance" to the program's participants
that they "will be free from later prosecution by the government or lawsuit
by Copyright owners for the very copyright infringement admitted under"
185. It may also sacrifice the financial stability of their parents, should they be faced with
potentially astronomical fines, or even a lawyer's bill for a few thousand dollars, an amount many
hard-working parents truly cannot afford.
186. Recording Industry Begins Suing P2P File Sharers Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music
Online, RIAA.com, Sept. 8, 2003, at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/090803.asp (last visited
Feb. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
187. See Clean Slate Program Description, MusicUnited.org, at http://www.musicunited.org/
cleanSlateDesc.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2004) (on file with author); Clean Slate Program Affidavit,
MusicUnited.org, at http://www.musicunited.org/cleanSlateAffidavit.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2004)
(on file with author).
188. Recording Industry Begins Suing P2P File Sharers Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music
Online, supra note 186 (emphasis added).
189. Music Industry Commences New Wave of Legal Action Against Illegal File Sharers,
RIAA.com, at http://www.riaa.comnews/newsletter/120303.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2003) (on file
with author).
190. Complaint at 1 1, Parke v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. (Super. Ct. Cal. Sept. 9, 2003),
available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/Parkev_RIAA/Parke_RIAAComplaint.pdf.
191. The Clean Slate Program is the RIAA's official name for its offer of amnesty. Sixty-Four
Individuals Agree to Settlements in Copyright Infringement Cases, RIAA.com, at http://www.riaa.
com/news/newsletter/092903.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
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this program. 92 In actuality, the "RIAA is only 'agreeing not to support or
assist in copyright infringement suits based on past conduct against
individuals who"' participate in the amnesty program; this program does not
in any way limit the copyright holders themselves from filing their own
lawsuit against the people who participate in this program. 93 Therefore, a
person who the RIAA had not yet identified - and may not have ever
identified - as a copyright infringer could unwittingly "turn himself in" by
taking part in this program; while he may receive amnesty from the RIAA,
in doing so he will be simultaneously announcing to the world that he is
guilty of sharing copyrighted songs. 194  Furthermore, the participant's
"admission" may end up being used against him if the actual copyright
holder later files suit.1 95 As of this writing, no court has ruled on the legality
of the RIAA' s amnesty program.
V. THE LEGALITY OF FILE-SHARING PROGRAMS
Perhaps the hottest current issue in the file-sharing world is whether the
P2P programs themselves (as opposed to the act of file-sharing) are legal.
The most important precedent in this area relates to VCRs, not file-sharing
programs. 196 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., a
1984 decision, the Supreme Court established what has since become known
as the "Betamax doctrine," named after the Sony Betamax video tape
recorder that was at the heart of that case. 197 The Betamax doctrine teaches
that "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory [copyright] infringement if the
product is... capable of substantial noninfringing uses.' '198 Although this
rule seems rather straightforward, the courts have applied it in an
inconsistent manner. 99 The Betamax doctrine was first applied to the world
192. Parke, Complaint atJ 1.
193. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
194. Since the RJAA "doesn't actually have the authority to grant real protections from civil
lawsuits. It doesn't own any copyrights, and its member labels aren't bound by this arrangement.
This means that you could still be sued by the major record labels that fund the RIAA, songwriters
or any other copyright holders." Why the RIAA's "Amnesty" Offer Is a Sham, EFF.org, at
http://www.eff.org/share/amnesty.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) (on file with author). Moreover,
in addition to potential civil liability, "a signed admission of guilt could make you a target for
criminal prosecution under the No Electronic Theft Act (NET Act). Any interested federal authority
could.., potentially pursue remedies from enormous fines to prison time." Id.
195. Parke, Complaint at 14.
196. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984); see also In
re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647-54 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1069
(2004) (discussing Sony and the Betamax VCR in great detail); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1020-22 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).
197. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; see also discussion supra Part II.B.1 ("The Betamax Defense").
198. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; see also discussion supra Part 111.B.1 ("The Betamax Defense").
199. Compare Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-22 (holding that the Betamax doctrine prevented the
court from imputing constructive knowledge of infringement, but it did not serve as a complete
of file-sharing in the Napster litigation, resulting in the demise of the
original P2P program.2 °°
A. What Happened to Napster?
The simple answer is that Napster was unable to withstand the financial
burden of prolonged litigation with the recording industry, and was therefore
forced into bankruptcy before its case could be fully resolved. 20' A&M
Records 202 initially sued Napster in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, alleging that Napster had committed both
contributory and vicarious infringement. 23 After the district court granted a
preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, 2°4 Napster appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 20 5 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to
the district court with an order to modify the preliminary injunction to "place
the burden on [the] plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of copyrighted
works... available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to
disable access to the offending content. ' ' 206  As a result, once the various
record labels notified Napster that specific copyrighted songs were being
shared over its network, Napster was forced to "filter" out access to all of
defense to contributory infringement), with Aimster, 334 F.3d at 647-54 (holding that the Betamax
doctrine did serve as a complete defense to contributory infringement, but still finding Aimster liable
for that offense because they did not assert any substantial noninfringing uses of their product), and
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160-63 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
686 (2004) (holding that the Betamax doctrine prevented the court from imputing constructive
knowledge of infringement, and since the defendants also lacked actual knowledge of the
infringement, the charge of contributory infringement was correctly dismissed on summary
judgment by the district court), and Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261-70 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendant's actions did not constitute contributory infringement since
the product in question was capable of substantial noninfringing uses).
200. Although a plethora of articles have been written about Napster, a brief summary is
necessary here to lay the foundation for the rest of this discussion. If the reader would like to learn
more about Napster, there are many excellent articles that cover the case in greater depth than this
Comment will. See, e.g., Lisa M. Zepeda, Note, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 71 (2002); Stephanie Greene, Reconciling Napster with the Sony Decision and Recent
Amendments to Copyright Law, 39. AM. Bus. L.J. 57 (2001).
201. See von Lohmann, supra note 83. Napster has recently reinvented itself as a legal "online
music store" named Napster 2.0. See Napster.com, at http://www.napster.com/ (last visited Jan. 26,
2004) (on file with author). As of this writing, Napster 2.0 offers over 1,000,000 songs for
downloading at the very reasonable cost of 99 cents per song or as little as $6.95 per album.
Napster.com Tutorial, at http://www.napster.comi/tutorialoverview3.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005)
(on file with author). In the alternative, a music lover may pay $14.95 per month for unlimited
downloads. Napster To Go, at http://www.napster.comntg.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005) (on file
with author).
202. A&M Records, Inc., was joined in this lawsuit by seventeen other major record labels,
including Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
203. Id. at 900.
204. Id. at 901.
205. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004.
206. Id. at 1027. The Ninth Circuit noted that, in addition to being required to remove
copyrighted files from its system once it is notified of the presence of such files, Napster "also bears
the burden of policing the system within the limits of the system." Id.
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those songs. 207 Napster tried in vain to implement filtering methods that
complied with the Ninth Circuit's mandate, but the burden was too great.2°8
The end result for the original Napster was bankruptcy.2°
The Napster decision, however, was not as simple as it might appear. In
the process of carving out its opinion, the Ninth Circuit established
important precedents pertaining to both contributory and vicarious
infringement. 2 0  As a result, Napster plays an important role in any
litigation pertaining to the legality of P2P software,21 particularly in the
Ninth Circuit.2t 2
1. Contributory Infringement
As previously discussed, in addition to proving that someone was guilty
of direct infringement, 213 there are two other elements to a claim of
contributory infringement: (1) knowledge and (2) material contribution.214
The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that Napster "had actual [knowledge]
of direct infringement because the RIAA informed it [that] more than 12,000
infringing files" existed on the Napster P2P network.2 5 It was also correct
in agreeing with the district court that "Napster materially contributes to the
infringing activity" by providing "support services" as well as "the site and
207. von Lohmann, supra note 83.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See discussion infra Part V.A.i.
211. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649-54 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004); see also von Lohmann, supra note 83.
212. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals encompasses, inter alia, the state of California, which is
home to the entertainment industry. Office of the Circuit Executive, United States Courts for the
Ninth Circuit at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). As such, the Ninth Circuit
plays a central role in most litigation involving the music industry. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affid, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686
(2004).
213. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding "that Napster users do not have a fair use defense" to direct infringement before reaching the
issues of contributory and vicarious infringement. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. For our purposes, this
discussion was important only to the extent that it established that Napster users were guilty of direct
infringement, which is a prerequisite to both contributory and vicarious infringement. See
discussion supra Part II.B.
214. The first of these elements requires that the defendant had either actual or constructive
knowledge of the infringing activity. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 (noting that "[c]ontributory liability
requires that the secondary infringer 'know or have reason to know' of direct infringement"); see
also discussion supra Part III.B. The second element requires that the defendant facilitated,
encouraged, assisted, or otherwise materially contributed to the infringing activity. See Napster, 239
F.3d at 1019; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
215. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 n.6; see also id. at 1020 n.5 (explaining reasons why district court
found Napster to have both actual and constructive knowledge of the infringing activities of its
users).
973
facilities" that enable its users to infringe upon copyrights.216 Where the
Ninth Circuit erred, however, was in its application of the Sony Betamax
doctrine,217 which the Supreme Court intended to serve as a complete
defense to contributory infringement.
218
As noted above, the Sony Betamax doctrine teaches that the sale of an
article of commerce "does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is... capable of substantial noninfringing uses., 21 9  The plain
language of this rule tells us that the Betamax doctrine was intended to serve
as a complete defense to a claim of contributory infringement. 220 The Ninth
Circuit, however, interpreted Sony to mean only that a court cannot impute
constructive knowledge to the maker of P2P software "merely because
[their] peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe
plaintiffs' copyrights., 22' Based on this interpretation, Ninth Circuit
plaintiffs may still establish liability for contributory infringement if they
can prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the infringing
activity, 222 even if the product has substantial noninfringing uses.223 As a
216. Id. at 1022. Napster maintained clusters of servers which stored a centralized index of the
songs available on their network and facilitated the transfer of files over that network. A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 896,905-08 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
217. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019-22.
218. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.8[B] (3d ed. 1999) ("In
[their Sony] decision, the Supreme Court borrowed a principle from patent law that manufacturers of
staple articles of commerce, suitable for substantial non-infringing uses, cannot be held as
contributory infringers. Otherwise, a finding of contributory infringement would give the plaintiff
effective control over the use of the item, placing it within the plaintiffs copyright monopoly. After
Sony, the seller.., of copying equipment... will not be liable as a contributory infringer even if
some buyers will predictably use the machine to infringe copyright.").
219. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added); see also discussion supra Part 1l.B.1.
220. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261, 262 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The
[Sony] Court held that... the sale of a product 'does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is ... capable of substantial noninfringing uses."').
221. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21. After opining that "Napster's actual, specific knowledge of
direct infringement renders Sony's holding of limited assistance to Napster," the Ninth Circuit
explained its position by stating - incorrectly - that in "adopting a modified 'staple article of
commerce' doctrine from patent law," the Supreme Court "declined to impute the requisite level of
knowledge where the defendants made and sold equipment capable of both infringing and
'substantial noninfringing uses."' Id. at 1020 (emphasis added). A close reading of Sony reveals
that this statement is incorrect; the Sony Court intended the Betamax doctrine to serve as a complete
defense to contributory infringement, not just the "knowledge" element thereof. See Sony, 464 U.S.
at 442 (stating that since "[tihe staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a
copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective... protection of the statutory monopoly, and the
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce," it follows that the
sale of an article of commerce "does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is...
capable of substantial noninfringing uses. The [only] question is thus whether the Betamax is
capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.") (emphasis added).
222. Keep in mind that, in order to prevail on an allegation of contributory infringement, a
plaintiff must also show that there was a material contribution to the direct infringement. See
discussion supra Part IU.B.
223. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21 (stating that "[riegardless of the number of Napster's
infringing versus noninfringing uses, the evidentiary record here supported the district court's
finding that plaintiffs would likely prevail in establishing that Napster knew or had reason to know
of its users' infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights." (emphasis added)); see also MGM Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aftd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9tb Cir. 2004),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (noting that the Ninth Circuit refused to hold Napster liable for
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result of this flawed logic, 224 the court found Napster liable for contributory
infringement because it had "actual knowledge that specific infringing
material is available using its system, that it could block access to the system
by suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the
material. 225
After Napster, the Betamax doctrine does not appear to be a valid
defense in the Ninth Circuit for companies that produce file-sharing
programs and are defending themselves against claims of contributory
infringement.226 Under the current state of the law in the Ninth Circuit, it
appears that the makers of a file-sharing program cannot be charged with
having constructive knowledge of the infringing activities of their users,
assuming that their program has substantial noninfringing uses.227 However,
if the copyright holder proves that the defendant had actual knowledge of
the infringing activity, then the defendant can only avoid liability for
contributory infringement if it did not have that knowledge "at a time when
[the defendant] materially contributes to the alleged infringement, and can
therefore do something about it."'228 As a result, whether or not the program
has a substantial noninfringing use appears to only have relevance in
establishing knowledge.229
contributory infringement "simply because it distributed software that could be used to infringe
copyrights.... Rather, liability for contributory infringement accrues where a defendant has actual
- not merely constructive - knowledge of the infringement .. "). The Ninth Circuit gave the
plaintiffs the burden "to provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such
works available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to disable access to the offending
content. Napster, however, also bears the burden of policing the system within the limits of the
system." Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027.
224. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 1069 (2004) ("The [Sony] Court was unwilling to allow copyright holders to prevent
infringement effectuated by means of a new technology at the price of possibly denying
noninfringing consumers the benefit of the technology. We therefore agree... that the Ninth Circuit
erred in [Napster] in suggesting that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient
condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer."). The Seventh Circuit still held Aimster
liable for contributory infringement, but only because Aimster "failed to produce any evidence that
its service has ever been used for a noninfringing use." Id. at 653.
225. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (emphasis in original).
226. See, e.g., Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161. In its recent Grokster opinion, the Ninth Circuit clearly
stated that "if the product at issue is capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing
uses, then the copyright owner" may still establish a claim of contributory infringement if he can
"demonstrate that the defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files and failed to
act on that knowledge to prevent infringement." Id. (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027) (emphasis
removed).
227. Id. at 1160 (noting that when a defendant shows "that its product [is] capable of substantial
or commercially significant noninfringing uses, then constructive knowledge of the infringement
[cannot] be imputed" to that defendant for purposes of a contributory infringement claim).
228. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1038; see also Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162-63.
229. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160-63.
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2. Vicarious Infringement
A&M Records also accused Napster of vicarious infringement.230
Similar to contributory infringement, a plaintiff making a claim under this
theory must prove that someone directly infringed upon his or her
copyright,231  as well as the following two elements: (1) the defendant
derived a direct financial benefit from the infringement, and (2) the
defendant had the right and the ability to supervise the third-party direct
infringer.232 The issue of direct infringement was not appealed by
Napster.233 The Ninth Circuit covered the "financial benefit" element in a
single paragraph, agreeing with the district court that Napster did indeed
have "a direct financial interest in the infringing" activities of its users.234
The "supervision" element, however, merits further discussion because it is
the element that differentiates Napster from the current group of file-sharing
programs, such as Grokster.235
Napster's downfall with respect to vicarious infringement was its ability
to control the activities of its users.236 If you have the ability to block your
users' access to the system "for any reason whatsoever," you can only avoid
vicarious liability by exercising that right to its fullest extent.237 Since
"Napster had the right and ability to police its system and failed to exercise
that right to prevent the exchange of copyrighted material, '23 the Ninth
Circuit correctly concluded that the supervision element of vicarious
infringement was satisfied.3
B. Why Have the Modem File-Sharing Programs Been Able to Survive?
In the wake of Napster, P2P developers appear to have "two options:
total control or total anarchy." 240 In other words, they can either create a
file-sharing program "that allows for thorough monitoring and control over"
their users' activities, or they can create "one that makes such monitoring
230. See discussion supra Part 111.B (explaining vicarious infringement); see also discussion supra
Part IL.B.1 (noting that the Betamax defense only applies to claims of contributory infringement,
and not claims of vicarious infringement).
231. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164.
232. See discussion supra Part Im.B; see also von Lohmann, supra note 83.
233. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (pointing out that
"the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs have presented a prima facie case of direct
infringement by Napster users is not presently appealed by Napster').
234. Id. at 1023. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had determined "that plaintiffs had
demonstrated they would likely succeed in establishing that Napster has a direct financial interest" in
the infringing activities of their users, especially since "the availability of infringing material [on the
Napster system] acts as a draw for customers." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
235. The Grokster litigation will be discussed in greater depth infra in Part V.B.
236. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023; see also von Lohmann, supra note 83.
237. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1023-24. Thus, even had the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the Sony Betamax
doctrine to give Napster a complete defense to the allegation of contributory infringement, Napster
would have still been liable under this theory. See id.
240. von Lohmann, supra note 83.
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and control impossible. '2 41 Most of the current P2P programs have chosen
the latter route.242
This theory was tested in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., a case
originally filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California. 243 The Grokster defendants make file-sharing programs that are
similar to Napster, but which lack the ability to monitor and control the
activities of their users.2"4 As a result, Grokster and Morpheus are more like
the video tape recorders at issue in Sony than Napster was; once they are
distributed to consumers, their makers have no knowledge of the activities of
those consumers, they do not contribute to those activities, and they lack the
ability to control them. 245 At least for the time being, this distinction has
enabled Grokster and Morpheus to avoid liability for contributory and
vicarious infringement, 246 thus avoiding the fate of the original Napster.
1. No Material Contribution to Any Infringing Activity
The file-sharing programs at issue in the Grokster litigation have
substantial noninfringing uses,247 so the defendants could not be charged
241. Id. In the former instance, they would avoid liability because they would be able to prevent
any and all infringing activity from taking place over their file-sharing network. See id. Choosing
the second option will allow them to avoid liability for reasons that will become clear after reading
this section.
242. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Grokster, however, peer-to-peer file-sharing programs
such as those at issue in that case are "not simply [tools] engineered to get around the holdings of
[the Napster decisions.] The technology has numerous other uses, significantly reducing the
distribution costs of public domain and permissively shared art and speech, as well as reducing the
centralized control of that distribution." MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1164
(9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
243. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2003), afftd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). The original defendants in Grokster were the makers of Grokster, Morpheus,
and Kazaa, three modem file-sharing programs. Id. at 1031-32. Since this case was initially filed,
Kazaa has stopped defending the action and a judgment of default was entered against them. Id. at
1032 n.2.
244. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041, 1045 ("Grokster "); Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163, 1165
("Grokster If'). In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that "[tlhe sort of
monitoring and supervisory relationship that has supported vicarious liability in the past is
completely absent in this case." Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1165. As a result, the file-sharing
programs at issue in Grokster "are more truly decentralized, peer-to-peer file-sharing networks" than
the original Napster was. Id.
245. Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1160-66.
246. Id. at 1157. The final say will be had by the Supreme Court during its 2004-2005 term. See
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (granting certiorari).
247. In fact, thousands of "musical groups have authorized free distribution of their music through
the internet." Grokster I1, 380 F.3d at 1161. The Ninth Circuit noted one particularly "striking
example" of such use. Id. The band Wilco, "whose record company had declined to release one of
its albums on the basis that it had no commercial potential," decided to give its album away for free
on the internet. Id. This decision "sparked widespread interest and, as a result, Wilco received
another recording contract." Id.
In addition to music files, file-sharing software "has been used to share thousands of public
domain literary works.., as well as historic public domain films." Id. Furthermore, file-sharing
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with having constructive knowledge of the activities of the users of those
programs.248 The Grokster court thus required actual knowledge of the
infringing activities to have existed "at a time at which they contribute[d] to
the infringement. '249  Since it was "undisputed that [the] Defendants are
generally aware that many of their users employ [their] software to infringe
copyrighted works," the "critical question" in the mind of the court was
whether they did "anything, aside from distributing software, to actively
facilitate - or whether they could do anything to stop - their users'
infringing activity. '250  Unlike Napster,' neither Grokster nor Morpheus
"provides the 'site and facilities' for direct infringement,"25" ' and as a result,
if the defendants "closed their doors and deactivated all computers within
their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with little or
no interruption., 252  Therefore, the court found that there was no "evidence
of active and substantial contribution to the" infringing activities in
question.2 53 Furthermore, the court also concluded that the defendants were
unable to stop those activities. 254  The Ninth Circuit thus upheld255 the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the
issue of contributory infringement.256
software has numerous additional substantial noninfringing uses such as "distributing movie trailers,
free songs or other non-copyrighted works; using the software in countries where it is legal; or
sharing the works of Shakespeare." Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035. Both Morpheus and
Grokster are "regularly used to facilitate and search for public domain materials, government
documents, media content for which distribution is authorized, media content as to which the rights
owners do not object to distribution, and computer software for which distribution is permitted." Id.
As the Ninth Circuit calculated, "even at a 10% level of legitimate use, as contended by the
[RIAA], the volume of use would indicate a minimum of hundreds of thousands of legitimate file
exchanges." Grokster H, 380 F.3d at 1162 n. 10 (emphasis added).
248. Grokster H, 380 F.3d at 1162.
249. Id. (quoting Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1020-22 (9th Cir. 2001))) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration added by Ninth
Circuit). As a result of this interpretation, "Plaintiffs' notices of infringing conduct are irrelevant if
they arrive when Defendants do nothing to facilitate, and cannot do anything to stop, the alleged
infringement." Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1037; see also Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162 (quoting
the lower court decision with approval). A different rule would not work: Imagine if Xerox could be
held liable for contributory infringement if someone used one of its machines to make an illegal
copy of a copyrighted file, just because it was notified of the action, even though it could do nothing
to stop it. von Lohmann, supra note 83.
250. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1038, 1039. The court does not consider "technical assistance
and other incidental services [to be] 'material' to the alleged infringement." Id. at 1042.
251. Id. at 1041; see also Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1163; discussion supra Part V.A.1 (discussing
the reasons why Napster was held liable for contributory infringement).
252. Grokster If, 380 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041) (internal
quotations omitted). This architecture stands in direct contract to Napster, which "indexed the files
contained on each user's computer," thus requiring "each and every search request [to pass] through
Napster's servers." Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012).
"Napster provided the 'site and facilities' for the alleged infringement, [so if] Napster deactivated its
computers, users would no longer be able to share files through the Napster network." Id.
253. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043; see also Grokster H, 380 F.3d at 1163-64.
254. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-43, 1045; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162-64.
255. GroksterI, 380 F.3d at 1160-64.
256. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
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2. No Ability to Control the Activities of Their Users
As was the case in Napster,25 the issue of vicarious infringement turned
on the element of supervision.258 Unlike Napster, however, Grokster and
Morpheus do not have the ability to control the networks over which file-
sharing takes place.259 Even though those networks are entirely outside the
control of the defendants, the plaintiffs still argued that "the software itself
could be altered to prevent users from sharing copyrighted files. 26 °
Although the plaintiffs' contention is true, the court pointed out that "the
obligation to 'police' arises only where a defendant has the 'right and
ability' to supervise the infringing conduct," which was "not the case
here."' 26' As a result, even though the court was aware of "the possibility
that [Grokster and Morpheus] may have intentionally structured their
businesses to avoid secondary liability for copyright infringement, while
benefitting financially from the illicit draw of their wares," it granted
summary judgment to the defendants on this issue.262
VI. SOLUTIONS AND PREDICTIONS
Any solution to the economic and legal issues confronting the music
world must start with the obvious: "Nothing [that the music industry has]
done so far has worked. In fact, [they have] made the problem much
worse." 263  Two types of solutions are available to the music industry:
economic solutions, and legal ones.
257. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
258. Similar to Napster, there was not much debate over whether the defendants derived a
financial benefit from the infringing activities of their users. Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1164; Grokster
1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043-44. The court concluded that it was "clear that Defendants derive a
financial benefit from [their users'] infringing conduct" because "[t]he ability to trade copyrighted
songs ... certainly is a 'draw' for many users of" the programs in question. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.
2d at 1043. As a result, the defendants were able to attract "a user base in the tens of millions,"
enabling them to "derive substantial revenue from advertising." Id. at 1043-44.
259. Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1164-66; Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d. at 1045. Unlike Napster, the
software programs in this case did not provide the defendants with the "ability to supervise or
control the file-sharing networks," nor did they permit the defendants "to restrict access to them [or]
police what is being traded as Napster could." Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
260. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
261. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1165-66.
262. Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046; see also Grokster IH, 380 F.3d at 1167 (affirming the
district court's grant of summary judgment). Both the district court as well as the Ninth Circuit
advised the defendants that Congress was the proper forum for their concerns about file-sharing, not
the judiciary. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046; Grokster I1, 380 F.3d at 1167 (citing Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)).
263. Goldring, supra note 1, at 14.
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A. Take Advantage of a Golden Economic Opportunity
According to Fred Goldring, a columnist for Billboard magazine, "[tihe
file-sharing age should be a golden age for artists, because more people are
listening to more (and a wider variety of) music than ever before. But every
day, the artists are missing out, held hostage by an obstinate industry,
paralyzed by fear of impending obsolescence. ' 264  Another commentator
predicted that digital downloads may be a $1.5 billion industry within five
years. 26 5 Fortunately for both artists and music lovers, the music industry is
finally starting to get with the times266 and offer legal digital downloads at a
reasonable price.267 Leading the way so far are services such as iTunes, a
creation of Apple Computer, and Napster 2.0.268 Since it appears that
"people [are] willing, to pay for [digital] downloads, the music should be
available because the alternative is losing the sale to free peer-to-peer
networks. 269  The entire music world will be better off if the industry
recognizes this simple fact and continues to provide customers more of what
they want. This strategy is certainly better than suing your customers into
oblivion.
B. ACCOPS: Congress' Attempt to Make a Bad Problem Worse
The Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and Security
Act of 2003, or ACCOPS, is Congress' latest attempt to stop file-sharing.27°
The ACCOPS bill, if passed, would make the penalties for file-sharing more
severe than some penalties for drug possession,27' further overcrowding
American jails in the process.272 Particularly disturbing is the fact that
264. Id.
265. Brian Garrity, How Big Can It Get?, BILLBOARD, Nov. 1, 2003, at 63.
266. This situation is analogous to the introduction of the VCR, which the entertainment industry
initially tried to have declared as contraband. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417. Today, the entertainment
industry derives substantial revenue from that same VCR, through both sales and rentals of movies.
See Oral Argument of Respondents, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
Feb. 3, 2004) (Nos. 03-55894 & 03-56236) (emphasis added), available at http://www.eff.org/
IP/P2P/MGMvGrokster/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (oral argument on file with author in MP3
format) ("Regulating technologies in their infancy is a bad idea.... Today, VCR's gamer more
income for the music industry than movies. They would not exist had the studios gotten their wish
and had them banned.").
267. See, e.g., Napster.com, http://www.napster.coml (last visited Mar. 3, 2004); iTunes,
http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
268. David Pogue, Paying the Piper, Round 2: The Repertory Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003,
atGI.
269. Garrity, supra note 67, at 23, 26 (paraphrasing Dan Fraser, who is the "president of Nettwerk
Management and manager for such artists as Coldplay, Avril Lavigne and Sarah McLachlan").
270. H.R. 2752, 108th Cong. (2003).
271. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(2) (listing the maximum penalty for an individual in possession of a
schedule IV controlled substance as three years in prison and a fine not to exceed $250,000); see
also id. § 841(b)(3) (listing the maximum penalty for an individual in possession of a schedule V
controlled substance as one year in prison and a fine not to exceed $100,000); id. § 812(c) (grouping
various controlled substances by schedule).
272. As one prominent attorney noted, such a stiff penalty "doesn't seem like a proportional
response. And it doesn't help get artists paid," either. Shachtman, supra note 9.
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ACCOPS would make "the uploading of a single copyrighted work to a
publicly accessible computer network" a felony pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §
506(a). 273  The maximum penalty for a violation of section 506(a) is five
years imprisonment as well as a fine.274 A second offense carries a
maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment, in addition to a fine.275 This
hardly seems like a proportional response to file-sharing.
C. File-Sharing Programs Will Survive, So Take Advantage of Them
In the aftermath of Napster and Grokster, it appears as though file-
sharing programs will survive despite the RIAA's best legal efforts to shut
them down.276 As such, it would be in the recording industry's best interests
to work with these programs to create a business model, similar to the way
that the movie industry and VCR makers work together to provide home
movies for sale and rent.277  That way, everybody wins: the music lovers
have their MP3s, and the music industry has its money.
S. Representative John Carter, a Republican from Texas, does not agree with Mr. von
Lohmann. Representative Carter went as far as to suggest that jailing college students for
downloading copyrighted music might be the answer. Katie Dean, Marking File Traders as Felons,
Wired.com, at http://www.wired.com/news/printl0,1294,58081,00.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2003)
(on file with author). In particular, he believes that "[i]f you were to prosecute someone and give
them three years, [then] this would act as a deterrent." Id.
273. 149 CONG. REc. E1496 (daily ed. July 17, 2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003 record&page=E1496&position=all (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
274. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1).
275. Id. § 2319(b)(2).
276. See discussion supra Part V.B. The Grokster appeal was heard by the Supreme Court during
the 2004-2005 term, with an opinion expected by July 2005. See discussion supra Part V. It is
likely that the Court would find that file-sharing programs have at least one substantial noninfringing
use, e.g., sharing non-copyrighted materials such as the works of Shakespeare, and will therefore
refuse to find them liable for contributory infringement. See discussion supra Part V. Since they
will likely be able to avoid liability for vicarious infringement as well, they will therefore avoid the
fate of the original Napster. See id.
277. During oral arguments in the Grokster appeal, Grokster attorney Michael Page pointed out:
Regulating technologies in their infancy is a bad idea. Imagine had the Supreme Court
agreed with appellants [in the Sony case] and had said [that] VCR's [sic] are illegal ....
Today VCR's [sic] garner more income for the music industry than movies. They would
not exist had the studios gotten their wish and had them banned.... This is not a new
theme. Every time a new technology comes along, those with a vested interest in the old
technology first ask the courts to ban it. Thankfully, the courts say "no," and when they
do, the copyright holders then find a way to make money off that new technology.
Because every time technology removes the transaction costs between the artist and the
consumer, that leaves money available for the artists. Radio was going to be the death of
copyright. [The music industry said,] "How can we compete with free? You're sending
our music out into the airwaves for free for anyone to have." But when courts decline to
stop technology, people find a way to develop those technologies to further develop non-
infringing uses of those technologies and to monetize them, and in the long run it is
always good for the consumers and the copyright holders. Efficiency is good for
everybody, and these systems are simply more efficient versions of distribution. They
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VII. CONCLUSION
Instead of taking advantage of what should be the music industry's
"dream," the industry "sued the original Napster into extinction. Now [it is]
pursuing the desperate measure of suing [its] own customers for doing what
[it] want[s] them to do - accumulate, listen to and recommend music - but
just not in the way [it] want[s] them to do it."'278 Fortunately for everyone
involved, the music industry has "one more chance for survival, but [it] has
to break its pattern [of dealing with problems after they happen] and think
about trends and the future, rather than... last year's methodology. 279
As aptly pointed out by an industry insider,
any solution must start with immediately abandoning our heavy-
handed strategy of "shock and awe." We're just going to drive our
customers further underground - maybe out of reach forever - and
make ourselves extinct in the process. People will continue to listen
to music, whether we're part of the process or not. The time to start
a real dialogue is now.
28°
For the recording industry's sake, one can only hope that it is not too
late to undo the damage it has done by suing and alienating its very own
customers. For the music lover's sake, one must hope that the music
industry realizes what it is doing before any more "ordinary, otherwise law-
abiding people" get dragged into court.28'
John A. Fedock
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have now reduced distribution costs, not low, but to zero. Courts should not step in and
stop that progress.
Oral Argument of Respondents, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. Feb. 3,
2004) (Nos. 03-55894 & 03-56236) (emphasis added), available at http://www.eff.orgllP/
P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (oral argument on file with author in MP3
format).
278. Goldring, supra note 1, at 14.
279. Eliot Van Buskirk, The Record Industry's Last Chance, CNET.com, at http://reviews.cnet.
com/4520-6450_7-5020716-1.html?tag=txt (last visited Feb. 4, 2004) (on file with author).
280. Goldring, supra note 1, at 14.
281. Id.
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